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be any more successful in its attempt to use the Court's Judgment to sway
public opinion in the United States and in other states.25
Against such gains must be weighed the loss in respect for the ICJ when
it acts like a court in name but not in deed. These cases of compulsory
jurisdiction display the Court in its weakest and least effectual role. In these
circumstances, the ICJ does not truly adjudicate disputes, if "adjudication"
has anything to do with a decision that actually settles a matter.
Plainly, much of the blame for the loss in respect for the Court rests on
the shoulders of noncomplying defendant states that are failing to observe
Article 94(1) of the Charter. Some fault, too, lies with applicant states that
use the Court as a public forum when they know that the ICJ has little
practical chance of effectively resolving a dispute. Realistically, it may be
time for us to recognize that, given the present context of world politics,
the compulsory jurisdiction provisions of the ICJ Statute are simply over-
optimistic and that the surer and better role for the Court is in the adjudi-
cation of cases jointly submitted by willing states. It may be time, too, for
the ICJ to contemplate a strategic retreat and in cases of compulsory juris-
diction to be willing to contemplate a doctrine of judicial restraint when it
seems unlikely that its decisions will be respected in practice.
MARK WESTON JANIS*
CUSTOM ON A SLIDING SCALE
Every student who has ever taken a traditional international law course
has learned Manley Hudson's four elements for the emergence of a rule of
customary international law:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable
period of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with,
prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.'
In the give-and-take of international relations, and in the jurisprudence
of the International Court, these elements have been compressed into two:
consistent state practice and Hudson's third element, the opin juris.2 In
25 For some of the public relations efforts of Nicaragua with respect to the Court'sJudgment,
see The Times (London), July 28, 1986, at 5; and id., July 30, 1986, at 5.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
'[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
See especially North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP.
3, 41-44 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
APPRAISALS OF NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,3 the Court has
raised the question whether-or at least to what extent-each of these two
elements must be established so as to demonstrate that a restrictive rule of
customary international law exists.
The Court found a rule of custom coinciding with Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, requiring states to refrain from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. In addition, the Court found customary duties on the nonuse of
force that are more specific than Article 2(4). This it did without any ref-
erence whatsoever to the ways in which governments actually behave. In-
stead, after noting that both parties accepted the treaty obligation of Article
2(4), the Court focused on the opinio juris, which it found primarily in res-
olutions of the UN and OAS General Assemblies.4
In particular, the Court relied on the UN Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.5 This resolution
was adopted by consensus and has a distinctly legislative tone, using man-
datory language throughout. If the Court had been able to point to consistent
state practice buttressing the articulated norms of the declaration, there
would be nothing startling about using the declaration to supply the elusive
subjective element. In fact, of course, the declaration's norms regarding the
nonuse of force and nonintervention are difficult to reconcile with some
conspicuous examples of state conduct, including conduct by both parties
to this case.
The Court relied on the same declaration, along with other international
instruments, to establish the principle of nonintervention.6 It did ask in this
instance whether practice is sufficiently in conformity with these declarations
to result in a rule of custom.7 Curiously, it did not attempt to answer its own
question. Instead, it defined the principle as a restrictive custom, and ex-
amined state practice only to see whether a permissive modification had
been established for intervention in support of rebel forces. Even on this
point, the Court focused on the lack of proffered legal justification when
intervention has occurred in such cases.' In other words, it dealt only with
the lack of opiniojuris for such a permissive course of conduct.
When issues of armed force are involved, it may well be that the need
for stability explains an international decision maker's primary reliance on
normative words rather than on a combination of words and consistent deeds.
In another vital area, human rights, the same thing has happened. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has come to be regarded as an au-
thoritative articulation of customary international law, at least with respect
' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
ICJ REP. 14 (Judgment ofJune 27).
Id. at 101-02, paras. 191-92.
GA Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
6 1986 ICJ REP. at 106-07, paras. 202-04. 7 Id. at 107-08, para. 205.
' Id. at 108-09, paras. 206-08.
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to the most fundamental rights, no matter how widespread or persistent the
nonconforming state conduct may be.9 It is understandable that decision
makers would tend to find customary rules in these areas. The alternative
would be an international legal order containing ominous silences-where
treaty commitments cannot be found-concerning the ways in which states
impose their wills on other states or on individuals.
When the stakes are not as high, international decision makers have not
been as quick to find restrictive customary rules. The classic example is
found in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 10 where the Court found neither
adequate state practice nor the necessary opinio juris to establish the equi-
distance principle as customary international law for continental shelf delim-
itation between adjacent states. The Lotus case" is another example. Anal-
ogous were the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases,' 2 where the Court found a per-
missive custom (in effect, the absence of a restrictive custom) allowing
preferential fishing rights for coastal states. The restrictive custom the Court
did find-based on high seas fishing rights and therefore inconsistent with
extended exclusive fishing rights asserted against longstanding foreign fishing
interests-simply drew on well-established state practice and opiniojuris. "
Since the Nicaragua case stresses opiniojuris at the expense of state practice,
one should ask whether there is precedent for the converse: a focus on state
practice without paying attention to governmental assertions and acquies-
cences that would establish an opiniojuris. Eminent writers have long taken
the position that from widespread, consistent state practice one may infer a
belief that the practice is required or permitted by law, at least if there is
little or no evidence of a contrary belief by the relevant actors.' 4 This has
' The Declaration has often been cited in subsequent declarations and resolitions. This is
evidence of state practice in one sense, but it does not reveal how governments actually act.
For discussion of the Declaration's effect as custom, see, e.g., Humphrey, The Univc'sal Declaration
of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS
AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21, 32-37 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979). In United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ REP. 3, 42 (Judgment of
May 24), the Court treated the fundamental principles in the Universal Declaration as legal
norms standing on their own and capable of being applied to state-supported conduct.
Another explanation of the Universal Declaration's normative significance is that it serves
as an interpretation and elaboration of the references to human rights in the UN Charter. See,
e.g., the official Canadian view in 1980 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 326.
10 1969 ICJ REP. 3. " 1927 PCIJ, ser. A, No. 10.
2 FisheriesJurisdiction Case (UK v. Ice.; FRG v. Ice.), 1974 ICJ REP. 3 and 175 (Judgments
ofJuly 25).
" The Court's holding on the merits has been overtaken by subsequent state practice. What
is important here is the Court's methodology in a case that involved armed confrontation on
only a small scale, between states that were normally allies.
14 See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 380 (1958); C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INI ERNATIONAL
LAw 62 (1965); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 8 (3d ed. 1979);
Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CoUPs 25, 69 (1970 I). Cf. C.JENKS, THE PROS.
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 253-54 (1964); C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND
REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 441 n.19 (rev. ed. 1968). To the contrary, see Ake-
hurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 32-34 (1974-75).
APPRAISALS OF NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES
not been lost on the International Court. In some cases it has given legal
significance to consistent state practice, without examining opiniojuris. This
seems inconsistent with Nicaragua and the cases stressing the need for an
opiniojuris. The cases can be reconciled, however, if one views the elements
of custom not as fixed and mutually exclusive, but as interchangeable along
a sliding scale.
On the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a
customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opiniojuris,
so long as it is not negated by evidence of non-normative intent. As the
frequency and consistency of the practice decline in any series of cases, a
stronger showing of an opiniojuris is required. At the other end of the scale,
a clearly demonstrated opiniojuris establishes a customary rule without much
(or any) affirmative showing that governments are consistently behaving in
accordance with the asserted rule.
Exactly how much state practice will substitute for an affirmative showing
of an opiniojuris, and how clear a showing will substitute for consistent be-
havior, depends on the activity in question and on the reasonableness of the
asserted customary rule. It is instructive here to focus on rules that restrict
governmental action. The more destabilizing or morally distasteful the ac-
tivity-for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of fun-
damental human rights-the more readily international decision makers
will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted restrictive
rule seems reasonable. The converse, of course, will be true as well. If the
activity is not so destructive of widely accepted human values, or if the
asserted rule seems unreasonable under the circumstances, the decision
maker is likely to be more exacting in finding the necessary elements for
the rule. A reasonable rule is always more likely to be found reflective of
state practice and/or the opinio juris than is an unreasonable (for example,
a highly restrictive or inflexible) rule. 6
These points may be illustrated by a relatively simple diagram (fig. 1, p.
150). It depicts a sliding scale for establishing a custom that restricts states'
freedom of action. The vertical axis measures the frequency of consistent
state practice by the relevant actors in any given case. The horizontal axis
measures the demonstrated strength of the opinio juris in that case. The
curves C, and C2 are restrictive custom curves in two paradigm cases: C,
" See The S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 PCIJ, ser. A, No. 1, at 25; Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein
v. Guat.), Second Phase, 1955 ICJ REP. 4, 22 (Judgment of Apr. 6). See also Dissenting Opinions
ofJudges Lachs and Sorensen in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ REP. at 218,
231, and 241, 246-47.
'6 See C. JENKS, supra note 14, at 254; cf M. SORENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 110-11 (1946). This probably explains the readiness of international tribunals to accept,
as custom, the major substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation and
Nonparticipation, 78 ASIL PROC. 271, 273 (1984), for a partial list of decisions. Some of the
principles set forth in the Fisheries case (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICJ REP. 116 (Judgment of Dec.
18), may also be explained in this way. Examples are the principle that a baseline does not have
to follow all the contours of the coast and the factors that determine the validity of straight
baselines.
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RESTRICTIVE CUSTOM CURVE
exemplifies the case of destabilizing or morally distasteful activity (for ex-
ample, the Nicaragua case or a case of systematic governmental detention
of individuals without trial); C 2 exemplifies the routine maritime boundary
dispute, where the parties are not threatening to use force against each
other. In each case, any combination of actual practice and articulated opinio
juris falling to the northeast of the relevant restrictive custom curve (for
example, at point D) establishes the restrictive customary duty. Any com-
bination of actual practice and articulated opiniojuris falling to the southwest
of the relevant restrictive custom curve (for example, at point E) does not
rise to the level of custom. A combination falling at point F would establish
a restrictive custom in a case like Nicaragua, but not in a more routine in-
stance. It is assumed in each case that the asserted customary rule is reason-
able under the circumstances.
The diagram, of course, does not provide a quick and easy :olution to
difficult cases. It simply illustrates what international decision makers such
as the International Court tend to do when a restrictive customary rule is
at issue. Most importantly, it provides a means for visualizing the de facto
sliding scale that combines actual state behavior with observable opiniojuris.
[Vol. 81
APPRAISALS OF NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES
It also helps explain how the Court in the Nicaragua case found customary
rules restricting the threat or use of force in the circumstances presented
to it.
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
THE NICARAGUA CASE AND THE
DETERIORATION OF WORLD ORDER
For all their greatness, democracies historically have difficulty in perceiving
and deterring totalitarian aggression. William Stevenson reminds us in A
Man Called Intrepid that debate raged within the United States as to whether
we should enter World War II on the side of England even after the rest of
Europe had fallen to the Nazis. The American ambassador to England cau-
tioned against such entry, arguing that England was militarily doomed. Pres-
ident Roosevelt, who had months earlier secretly committed U.S. intelligence
assets to British support, felt that he did not have the necessary popular
support to enter the war. And the British were so concerned about American
indecisiveness that even after Pearl Harbor they executed a covert operation
to persuade Hitler to declare war on the United States, which, of course,
he did before America entered the war against Germany.1
This historic difficulty of the democracies, which is rooted in a healthy
abhorrence of war and a mirror imaging of the good faith motives of others,
is placed under particular stress when aggressive attack is concealed. Tra-
ditionally, aggression has meant armies openly on the march across inter-
national boundaries. Hitler could delay the democracies' understanding of
the attack on Poland by staging a fake Polish attack on Germany. But within
a week the resulting misinformed New York Times story on the Polish raid
and expected general Polish attack was swept aside as the reality of Panzer
armies and Stuka attacks against Poland brought home the Nazi aggression.
2
As Afghanistan should remind us, such open aggressive attacks can still take
place; and when they do, they are generally perceived as aggression. But
more often in the contemporary international system, aggressors rely on
sophisticated and secret support for terrorist attacks, coups or protracted
guerrilla "liberating struggles." By denying these attacks, the aggressors
seek to compound the problem of the world community in responding to
them and to receive the protection of the very system of world order they
are attacking. Sadly, there is every indication that the strategy of secret war
is working to inhibit the democratic response and deterrence of aggressive
attack. More ominous for the future of world order, this strategy of secret
warfare is destroying the very fabric of the international immune system
against aggressive attack as the secret attack blends in with a background
* Professor and Dean, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Board of Editors.
See W. STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID 82-84, 114, 123, 299-300 (1976).
2
Id. at 45.
1987]
